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Alvy Singer: [addressing the camera] There's an old joke - um... two elderly 
women are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one of 'em says, Boy, the food 
at this place is really terrible. The other one says, Yeah, I know; and such 
small portions. 
(Annie Hall, 1977) 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A major debate followed the Ideological Congress held by the most important 
political party (Christian Democrats) of Chileans ruling coalition (Concertación) 
on September of 2007. By a wide margin, it approved a proposal to eliminate a 
subsidy through vouchers to for-profit private schools. 
Due, at least in part, to this proposed resolution, the ruling coalition and 
the opposition agreed on a wide range of proposals for reforming the educational 
system, none of which explicitly forbid for-profit schools, but that imposed further 
restrictions on them. 
At the moment of writing this paper (July, 2008), the proposed reform is 
under discussion on the parliament, accompanied by protests by groups of students 
and teachers unions that ask for banning for-profit schools. 
 Making for-profit private schools ineligible to receive vouchers would be a 
radical departure from the main ideas behind the pioneering reform that 
introduced the voucher system in Chile in 1981.  
The reform entailed transferring public schools to municipalities, thus 
decentralizing primary and secondary education. Since then, school administration 
has been carried out by both public (municipalities) and private providers (referred 
to as administrators) that receive most of their funds from vouchers and, in some 
cases, from fees paid by parents. The voucher is transferred to the school according 
to the number of students who attend classes. The decision of which school to 
attend is left to the parents. 
The system has achieved almost universal coverage, and impressive results 
in terms of increasing the number of schools and their infrastructure. However, by 
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international comparisons, results in terms of quality have been rather 
disappointing. 
The educational system comprises three types of schools: 
• Public: Administered by municipalities and financed primarily with 
vouchers. 
• Subsidized: Administered by private institutions and financed 
primarily by vouchers (with small additional payments made by 
parents). 
• Private: Administered by private institutions and financed exclusively 
by payments made by parents and private transfers. 
Private administrators in subsidized and private schools may or may not be 
for-profit organizations. 
In terms of enrollment, the share of students attending private schools has 
remain virtually unchanged since 1981, but the enrollment in subsidized schools 
administered privately has increased steadily; thus, decreasing the share of 
enrollment in public schools (Paredes and Pinto, 2008).  
 The argument behind effectively banning a profit motive in the education 
industry (as opposed to, say, the ice cream industry) is not clear. Although the 
academic debate regarding the superior performance of private schools with respect 
to public schools is not settled, most of the empirical literature finds support for 
it.1 However, to our knowledge, there is no evidence that supports the claim that 
non-profit schools perform better (or worse) that for-profit schools. 
Even in that case, as altruism is not at free disposal, in the absence of a 
profit motive, the number of non-profit schools will not necessarily increase in the 
amount necessary to absorb students of for-profit schools. Furthermore, some 
characteristics of non-profit schools may not accommodate the preferences of some 
parents. Thus, banning for-profit schools could make the students of for-profit 
schools worse off as some of them may end up having to attend public schools. 
                                                 
1 Some examples are Hoxby (1994, 2000, 2005), Rothstein (2004, 2005), Lavy (2005), Sandstrom 
and Bergstrom (2005), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), Chumacero et al (2008), and references therein. 
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Revealed preferences suggest that parents that choose to send their children 
to for-profit schools consider them more attractive than public schools or non-profit 
schools, as both alternatives could have been chosen instead. 
This paper uses several econometric specifications to quantify the differences 
in the performance in standardized tests for students of different types of schools, 
stressing the differences between for-profit, non-profit and public schools. The 
paper also provides some additional considerations that should guide the debate 
regarding this matter. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
simple theoretical framework to understand the differences between for-profit and 
non-profit private schools. Section 3 describes the construction of the data-set used 
in Section 4 to conduct different econometric exercises to test the differences on the 
performances of students of different types of schools. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 A (very) Simple Model 
 
Unlike other products, education is provided by a variety of agents (public and 
private). Furthermore, private providers of education differ significantly. They differ 
on dimensions such as the number of schools they operate, the characteristics of the 
education they provide, the types of students they attract, the values or 
competences they supply, and, of course, if they explicitly pursue a profit motive or 
not. Such heterogeneity exists because this market values diversity. 
 Rose-Ackerman (1996) considers three interrelated functions that non-profits 
may serve: First, due to monitoring costs, donors may prefer to sponsor non-profit 
firms (Easley and OHara, 1983). Second, due to information asymmetries regarding 
the quality of a service, donors may prefer to sponsor non-profits as for-profits may 
have more incentives to misrepresent. Finally, donors may derive pleasure from 
supporting specific causes or advocating certain values. Then, non-profits may exist to 
cater these causes or values. 
 There is no consensus regarding the economic efficiency of non-profit firms. In 
cases, they may push the quality and quantity of the service provided beyond a 
socially optimal level. On the other hand, they may be more efficient than the 
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government in the provision of some public goods, as taxes will not generally reflect 
the benefit from the service (Holtmann, 1983). 
 This section derives a simple model to evaluate some of the possible differences 
between for-profit and non-profit schools. 
 Let us start by considering the problem of a for-profit school. The objective 
function of the administrator is to maximize: 
 ( ), ,pf q x rq sxπ = − −  (1) 
where p is the price charged for each student and ( )f ⋅  corresponds to the number 
of students. This number is determined by two factors that the school chooses. The 
first, q, represents the quality of the service provided and is summarized in, say, 
performance in standardized tests. The cost of producing one unit of q is r. It is 
assumed that 0.qf >  
 The second factor, x, summarizes other characteristics of the school that 
parents value that can be interpreted as a qualitative feature of the service provided.2 
The price of this factor is s.3 It is assumed that 0xf >  if 0,x x<  0xf =  if 0,x x=  
and 0xf <  if 0.x x>  This implies, that 0x  is the optimal level of x as far as the 
parent is concerned. 
The administrator maximizes (1) and arrives to the standard first order 
conditions that equate prices of inputs to their marginal productivities:  
 
0
.
0
q
x
pf r
pf s
− =
− =
 (2) 
 Note that the only case in which it is optimal to provide 0x  is if s=0. When 
providing x is costly (s>0), the school will provide a level of x that is lower than 0.x  
On the other hand, if the school receives resources for providing x (s<0), it is optimal 
for it to provide more x than the parent considers optimal. 
 The sufficient conditions for profit maximization are:  
 20,  0,  0,qq xx qq xx qxf f f f f< < − >  (3) 
where the second condition is implied by the first and last. 
                                                 
2 For example, it may involve features as religious (or secular) formation, emphasis on recreational 
activities, etc. 
3 Given the characteristics of x, s may be zero (volunteers) or even negative (fund-raising). 
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 Furthermore, the firm will demand less q and x when their respective prices 
increase: 
( )20,  0,  = .qqxx qq xx qx
fq f x p f f f
r s
∂ ∂
= < = < ∆ −
∂ ∆ ∂ ∆
 
 On the other hand, the signs of 
qxfq x
s r
∂ ∂
= = −
∂ ∂ ∆
 
depend on the sign of .qxf  If q and x are complements, both derivatives are negative. 
 Finally, how q and x respond to increments in p can not be determined without 
imposing further structure. However, it can be shown that at least one of them will 
increase and most likely both. 
 Next consider the problem faced by the non-profit school. Following 
Steinberg (1986), we assume that it maximizes:  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ), 1 , ,G k k pf q x rq sx k pf q x= − − + −  (4) 
where 0 1k< <  is a fixed parameter. Note that with k=1, (4) collapses to (1) and we 
are back to the case where the firm maximizes profits. With k=0, the first term drops 
out, and the firm maximizes gross revenue.4 
 Assuming the same technology ( )f ⋅  as above, the administrator maximizes 
(4) and arrives to the following first order conditions:  
 
0
,
0
q
x
pf kr
pf ks
− =
− =
 (5) 
which appear to imply that if r and s are positive, this firm would provide more q 
and x than the for-profit firm. The sufficient conditions for maximizing (4) are also 
given by (3). 
 It can also be shown that 
                                                 
4 This is not the only way in which the non-profit firm could be modeled. For example, Rose-
Ackerman (1987) considers that managers may seek to maximize a function ( ),u q x  subject to the 
constraint of ending up with zero profits: ( ), 0.pf q x rq sxπ = − − =  In our example, the 
preferences of the school administrator may differ from the preferences of the parents in the sense 
that (for example) 0.xu >  In that case, the school may have an additional incentive to supply 
more x than the parents considers optimal. The literature on non-profits also stresses the 
introduction of fund-raising in its objective function or constraint. This factor is not explicitly 
incorporated here, but can be made operative with changes in s. 
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0,  0
,
qqxx
qx
kfq kf x
r s
kfq x
s r
∂ ∂
= < = <
∂ ∆ ∂ ∆
∂ ∂
= = −
∂ ∂ ∆
 
which imply that the responses are similar to the for-profit firm, but are scaled down 
by the factor k. 
 On the other hand, the responses of q and x to changes in p are identical to 
those of the for-profit firm. 
 An interesting aside corresponds to how q and x change with increases in k. 
That is, would q and x increase or decrease as the objective function of the non-profit 
firm resembles the objective function of the for-profit firm? 
 It can be shown that:  
,
xx qx
qq qx
rf sfq
k
sf rfx
k
−∂
=
∂ ∆
−∂
=
∂ ∆
 
whose signs can not be determined without imposing further restrictions. If both s and 
qxf  are positive, the non-profit firm would provide more of both q and x than the for-
profit firm. 
 Of course, these results assume that the for-profit and non-profit firms have 
access to the same technology and face the same prices. Because of the discussion 
presented above, by the own nature of non-profits this is not necessarily the case. If 
non-profits tend to receive more donations based on their stance on x, and the optimal 
level of x differs between donors and parents, non-profits may end up sacrificing q  
and providing too much x. 
 The coexistence of both for-profit and non-profit schools signals that there is 
demand for a variety of combinations of these dimensions, and some non-profits may 
specialize on providing a specific combination depending on their availability of 
donors, volunteers, etc. The same can be said with respect to for-profit firms that may 
choose different technological processes. 
 In the educational sector there is also a third relevant provider: the public 
sector. It is often contended that it has a different objective function than the private 
sector, although it is not explicitly stated. Some argue that it could resemble (4) with 
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k=0, but, if that were the case, the first order conditions would imply that q and x 
should be higher than the ones in for-profit and non-profit firms. 
 The mere fact that the government is a provider of education is subject to 
debate. The usual argument for it is that education of an individual provides a 
positive externality that is not considered when buying education. In that case, the 
result is too little education.5 By taxing those who receive the benefit and subsidizing 
those who purchase education, the welfare of both groups can be improved. 
 Of course, this would require setting the correct levels of taxes and subsidies. 
For that, a precise measure of the externality is required. Empirically, it appears that 
the private benefits overwhelm the externalities, particularly in the case of people that 
are supposed to provide the greatest externalities (see Lott, 1987, for this and related 
arguments). 
 As this section shows, there may be instances in which non-profit schools may 
provide more q than for-profit schools. It also shows that they may also provide more 
(or less) of other factors than the ones that would be optimal for households. The 
empirically relevant questions are if these differences exist and, if so, their orders of 
magnitude. On the other hand, revealed preferences and the historical evidence 
suggest that parents choose to leave public schools as their income increases. The next 
sections quantify the differences in terms of results on standardized tests. 
 
                                                 
5 Lott (2007) provides a fascinating account of the genesis of public education in the United States. 
Apparently, in the 1820s, legislators in New York were concerned that students may be receiving the 
wrong type of education because most of the (private) schools were run by Catholic churches. They 
decided to subsidize Protestant schools through a system similar to vouchers. As it often happens, this 
policy had unintended consequences. To attract students of Catholic schools, the Protestant schools 
began to teach more of what Catholic parents and students wanted (math, reading, and writing) and 
less of what they did not want (Protestant religious training). As legislators saw that their objective 
was not met, they progressively decided to run the schools themselves. This has led some observers to 
conclude that the provision of public education has more to do with indoctrination. For example, Lott 
(1999) shows that totalitarian regimes (that have the greatest returns to indoctrination), are more likely 
to make large investments in education and at the same time make parental involvement in their 
childrens lives more costly. 
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3 The Data 
 
As argued in the Introduction, there are several empirical studies that have tried to 
quantify the determinants of the choice of the type of school, and the differences in 
terms of performance in standardized test between public, subsidized, and private 
schools. 
 Although there is no consensus, the majority of studies conclude that, after 
controlling for other factors, private schools tend to do better than subsidized schools, 
and these do better than public schools. 
 The recent proposal to ban for-profit schools from the voucher system 
implicitly assumes that students would be better off in their absence. However, to our 
knowledge, there is no systematic study that proves this claim. 
 The data set that we use to evaluate the determinants of the performance of 
students has information of the results of the standardized test (called SIMCE) for 
255,431 fourth grade students in the year 2005. With the data base it is possible to 
gather information regarding some individual characteristics of the students such as 
result on the test and gender; characteristics of the household of the student such as 
years of schooling of the parents, income, and reported expenditures on education; 
characteristics of the school such as its location, type of school (public, subsidized, or 
private), number of schools managed by one administrator, number of students,  
criteria used for admitting students, and managerial characteristics. Regretfully, with 
this information one can not distinguish between for-profit and non-profit schools.  
 This paper does so by using the following strategy. Each school has an ID 
number (known as RBD). The RBD number of each of the 11,152 schools can be used 
to collect information of the Tax ID number of the school (known as RUT).6 The 
RUT number can then be used to distinguish the for-profit or non-profit status of 
each school. With this information, we can distinguish between two types of 
administrators in public schools (municipalities and corporations set by 
municipalities). For the case of subsidized and private schools, we distinguish between 
                                                 
6 We thank Rodrigo Bosch for providing us this information and for suggesting the way to separate 
for-profit and non-profit schools. 
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for-profit and non-profit schools. Non-profits can further be divided in foundations 
and religious organizations. 
 Approximately half of the students of the sample went to public schools (32.4% 
managed by municipal directions and 17% by corporations established for that 
purpose by the municipalities). The share of students attending for-profit schools was 
of almost 34%, with the vast majority attending subsidized schools. Finally, the 
students in non-profit schools corresponded to no more than 17% of the students and 
were primarily administered by religious organizations (Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 around here] 
 Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the results of the standardized 
tests of the students by type of school attended. The differences in performance 
between public, subsidized, and private schools are significant. The average score 
in subsidized (private) schools is 21 (60) higher than in public schools. At least at 
the aggregate level, there are no statistical differences among public schools (either 
municipal directions or corporations). If we evaluate the difference between public 
schools and privately administered schools (either subsidized or private) according 
to whether they are for-profit or not, students in for-profits schools have (on 
average) 25 more points than students in public schools. The gap with public 
schools rises to 29 points in favor of non-profit schools. Thus, only considering 
these factors, for-profits perform substantially better than public schools and 
marginally worse than non-profits. 
[Table 1 around here] 
 As almost all private schools are for-profit, it could be argued that the 
correct comparison should be done between public schools and for-profit and non-
profit subsidized schools. On average, there are no differences in the performance of 
non-profit schools run by foundations or religious organizations. Consistent with 
the model of section 2, non-profits tend to perform better than for-profit subsidized 
schools (in average by 13 points). However, for-profit schools still have a 16 point 
advantage over public schools. 
 Another interesting result is that the standard deviations of the results in 
tests are remarkably similar across school types. 
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 Table 1 considers that the only source of the difference among students is 
the type of school. The next section considers other factors. 
 
4 Results 
 
The choice of school is not random. It may come from a complex process of 
matching between parents and school administrators. Different schools may 
promote different sets of values (apart from academic achievements) that may 
attract some parents and not others, and have different characteristics (such as 
location) that are relevant when the match takes place. 
 The results of Table 1 may be falsely attributing better results to a type of 
school, when the difference may be due to other factors. Carefully considering other 
relevant factors could help to identify the contribution of each type of school. The 
results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2. 
[Table 2 around here] 
 Column I of Table 2 presents the estimated difference with respect to the 
Municipal Corporation for other types of schools without controlling for other factors. 
Including gender (males perform marginally better) and whether or not the school is 
rural does not change the effects (Column II). Columns III to V include other 
variables such as up to quadratic terms of the income and expenditures in education 
of the household, and the education of the mother.7 The gap between private and 
public schools decreases in up to 40 points. Non-profits continue to perform better 
than for-profit subsidized schools, but the margin also narrows (although in all these 
cases, it may be argued that these variables proxy selection by the demand). Column 
VI incorporates variables that include information on whether or not the school uses 
some criteria for selecting students (based on religion, tests, etc). The effect of these 
variables marginally reduces the gap with respect to Column V. However, based on 
conventional information criteria, the model of Column VI is not superior to the one 
of Column V. Column VII includes information on managerial practices of the 
                                                 
7 The results are robust to including the education of the father but, due to missing values, 
including it eliminates close to 5,000 observations. 
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administrators. Regretfully, this information is not available for private schools which 
had to be excluded from the estimation. These variables increase the gap between 
subsidized and public schools.8 Column VIII includes what are called peer effects. It is 
stated that this variable may capture the positive externalities for a student 
associated with having good peers. This variable has received a lot of attention due in 
part to the fact that its inclusion significantly diminishes the differences between 
public and subsidized schools. However, there is a serious problem with this 
interpretation. For one, the magnitude of the alleged peer effect is substantial. 
Although not reported in Table 2, its coefficient is of 0.5, which indicates that half of 
the score of the students would be accounted by this effect. Furthermore, a one point 
increase in the score of the peers would increase the score of the student in half a 
point. This magnitude is simple not credible. There is one more issue that makes this 
figure questionable: As shown in Table 1, the standard deviation of the test is 
relatively stable among types of schools (around 50 points). However, the volatility of 
the variable that attempts to capture the peer effect inside a school is (by 
construction) very low. This is due to the fact that the mean would only vary much 
when excluding the end points (best and worst scores). Given this fact, the alleged 
peer effect is undistinguishable from a fixed effect of the school which may be due to 
some other characteristic of the school (good professors, etc). 9 Thus, one should be 
extremely careful in attributing a peer effect independent to the type of school to this 
variable. In that case, the reduction in differences should not be as important. Be it as 
it may, even if the variable is interpreted as a peer effect, it is still possible that it 
may vary with the type of school. The last column of Table 2 includes a regression in 
which the alleged peer effect interacts with the type of school. That column reports 
the coefficients of such interactions. Note that the interaction with the public school is 
                                                 
8 It is instructive to note than even after including variables that proxy selection by the schools, 
incorporating variables that proxy managerial skills complete dominate the former and increase the 
gap. 
9 One related matter casts doubts on the interpretation of this effect. The median of the score of 
the class dominates the mean score when both are included. As the median is less sensitive to the 
removal (or inclusion) of extreme observations, its variation in a class is even lower than the mean. 
Thus, the inclusion of any of these variables is more likely to be a fixed and not an externality. 
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negative. This implies that as the average score of a class increases, the externality 
to the other students of the public school is negative. On the other hand, private 
schools and subsidized schools display a positive effect. 
 As the effect varies with the average score of the class, the net effect by type of 
school can not be directly computed. Figure 2 shows the difference with respect to 
Municipal Corporations for average scores that range between the average score of 
public schools (240) and private schools (300). Municipal directions start up slightly 
better than municipal corporations and subsidized schools but deteriorate sharply 
(and fast) when the average score increases. They do not dominate private schools in 
the range considered. Subsidized schools perform uniformly better than municipal 
corporations in the range considered and (if we take this interaction seriously) would 
even outperform private schools if evaluated at the average score of private schools. 
Non-profits perform uniformly better than for-profit subsidized schools in the range, 
but would presumably not perform better for lower average scores. 
 Should we take these results seriously? Clearly, if the peer effect exists, it is 
differentiated among types of schools. It is however difficult to make the case that this 
effect should be greater in subsidized schools than in private schools at the level of the 
average score of private schools. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presents empirical estimations to determine the effects of the type of 
school on the performance of students. In particular, it differentiates for-profit and 
non-profit schools. 
 Our results suggest that existing non-profits may perform better than for-profit 
schools. However, when considering banning for-profit subsidized schools the relevant 
comparison ought to be with respect to public schools. Regardless of the way in which 
this difference is estimated, for-profit schools tend to perform better than municipal 
schools. The difference in test scores may vary from 3 to up to 15 points with our best 
estimate being of around 10 points. 
 There are several reasons why banning for-profits is not a good idea. First, it 
may be the case that parents that choose for-profits with respect to non-profits do so 
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because they value other characteristics of the school that caters their preferences. 
Banning for-profits would force parents to send their children to a school with which 
they do not share values or principles. Second, revealed preferences show that parents 
that send their children to for-profits consider them a better alternative than public 
schools. This is so because, the latter was an affordable choice and the parent chose 
not to do it. Third, even though we find robust evidence that, at present, non-profits 
perform better than for-profits; this situation could change if for-profits are banned. 
They could leave the market, transform themselves into entirely private schools, or 
continue to attend the voucher sector by becoming non-profits. Neither of these 
situations is recommendable. By leaving the market, students that chose the school 
would be forced to migrate against their will. By becoming a private school all the 
students that went to that school thanks to the voucher would be forced to leave. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the choice of being a for-profit or a non-
profit organization is not random. Administrators have different abilities and are 
interested in catering different types of students. Forcing a for-profit school to 
surrender its profit motive could be undesirable because it could force them to enter 
into other areas and inefficiently inflate costs. Genuine for-profits and non-profits 
manage their resources differently. It is not a coincidence that a large number of non-
profits belong to religious or philanthropic organizations. One must remember that 
Mother Teresa and Bill Gates are special precisely because they are scarce. As 
altruism is not at free disposal, banning for-profits does not transform administrators 
in altruists. Another reason why banning for-profit voucher schools is not a good idea 
is that the ban may impede good private schools from moving to the subsidized sector 
if the amount of the voucher is increased. 
 Finally, banning the profit motive in the subsidized sector could force students 
to attend public schools. As Alvy Singer reminds us, given the track record of public 
schools in the past, it is strange to complain about its shrinking size and ask for a 
bigger portion. 
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Figure 1 
Shares of Students by Type of School 
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Figure 2 
Difference with respect to Municipal Corporation (with Interactive Peer Effects) 
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Table 1 
Results of Standardized Tests by Type of School 
Subsidized Public 
Non-Profit 
Variable 
Corporation Direction Total 
For-
Profit Foundation Religious Total 
Total 
Private Total 
Mean 239 240 240 256 267 269 269 261 301 253 
Median 241 242 242 260 273 275 274 266 306 256 
Max 364 364 364 365 364 365 365 365 365 365 
Min 106 101 101 100 120 120 120 100 101 100 
Std. Dev. 49 48 48 49 48 46 47 48 37 50 
Observations 43401 82769 126170 69301 13142 30230 43372 112673 16588 255431 
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Table 2 
Results of Standardized Tests with Different Specifications (with respect to MC) 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
MD 1 (0.2) 2 (0.3) 4 (0.3) 4 (0.3) 4 (0.3) 4 (0.3) 5 (0.3) 2 (0.3) -0.17 (0.019) 
SFP 17 (0.3) 16 (0.3) 10 (0.3) 9 (0.3) 8 (0.3) 6 (0.3) 10 (0.4) 3 (0.3) 0.07 (0.019) 
SNP 29 (0.3) 29 (0.3) 19 (0.3) 18 (0.3) 16 (0.3) 12 (0.4) 14 (0.5) 6 (0.4) 0.13 (0.020) 
PRI 61 (0.4) 60 (0.4) 35 (0.4) 21 (0.6) 20 (0.6) 16 (0.6)  3 (0.6) 0.01 (0.004) 
Gender No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Expenditure No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
School Choice No No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Management No No No No No No Yes No No 
Peers No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Interaction No No No No No No No No Yes 
Observations 255431 255431 234401 225926 216464 216464 143256 225926 225926 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.26 
Notes: MC=Municipal Corporation. MD=Municipal Direction. SFP=Subsidized for-profit. SNP=Subsidized non-profit. PRI=Private. Education=Years of 
Schooling of the mother. Income (Expenditure)=Level and squared income (expenditure in education) of the household. School choice=Dummy variables 
for different types of selection by the school. Management=Dummy variables for managerial functions performed. Peers=Mean of score of peers. 
Interaction=Mean of score of peers interacting with type of school. Robust Standard Deviations in parenthesis. 
